This technical write-up covers the analysis of the compressed archive SandlotOutmatchGolfPound.7z , detailing its contents, observed behaviors, and potential security implications. Archive Overview : SandlotOutmatchGolfPound.7z Format : 7-Zip (LZMA/LZMA2 compression) Estimated Complexity : Moderate
: Used for environmental fingerprinting, checking for virtualization (anti-VM), and disabling Windows Defender features. SandlotOutmatchGolfPound.7z
Gathered data is staged in a hidden directory (often in %TEMP% or %APPDATA% ) before being compressed and transmitted via HTTP/HTTPS POST requests to the attacker's infrastructure. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Value/Description [Varies by build; verify against local sample] Directory %LOCALAPPDATA%\Sandlot\Config\ Network Outbound traffic to high-port ranges (e.g., 8080, 4444) Registry Key This technical write-up covers the analysis of the
: A secondary blob that is decrypted in memory to avoid signature-based detection. Operational Workflow 1. Extraction and Initial Execution : Change passwords for all accounts accessed from
: Small, obfuscated binaries designed to achieve persistence and bypass local security prompts.
: Change passwords for all accounts accessed from the infected machine, focusing on high-value targets like email and VPNs.
Upon extraction, the user is often prompted to run a decoy document or a "setup" file. This triggers a silent PowerShell command that downloads additional dependencies from a remote Command and Control (C2) server. 2. Reconnaissance Phase The malware executes commands to gather:
